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Torts-Parent-Child Immunity-RELUCTANCE TO FURTHER ABROGATE THE
IMMUNITY RuLE-Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
Although there is no case authority, it is probable that at common law
there was no prohibition against a minor child bringing suit against his par-
ent for a personal tort.' Indeed, a child could enforce his own choses in
action2 and sue for wrongs to his property.3 Similarly, in the United States
prior to 1891, case law seemed to indicate that there was no parent-child
immunity.4 However, after that date, without citing any common law
precedent, three cases laid the basis for the parent-child tort immunity rule
by holding a parent not liable for a tort inflicted upon his unemancipated
minor child.5
In the recent case of Wright v. Wright 6 the Virginia Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of whether an unemancipated minor child could maintain
a tort action against a parent. The plaintiff in Wright instituted a suit
1See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). See also W. PRossER, HAND-
BOOK OF Tm LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971):
Although there were no old decisions, the speculation on the matter has been
that there is no good reason to think that the English law would not permit ac-
tions for personal torts as well, subject always to the parent's privilege to enforce
reasonable discipline against the child.
2 Wilton v. Middlesex R. R., 125 Mass. 130 (1878); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376
(1854).
3 See Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A.
292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Roberts v. Roberts, 145
Eng. Rep. 399 (Ex. 1657). Apparently, a child could sue with regards to his property
or his own choses in action because there was no conception of unity of legal identity
with the parent. The child remained a separate legal person.
4 Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (No. 5,636) (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1836) (involving
acts injurious to the life or health of the child or constituting a public offense); Nelson
v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885) (involving gross neglect); Lander v.
Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) (involving unreasonable punishment).
5 Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (involving a suit by a minor
daughter against her mother for maliciously confining her in an insane asylum); Mc-
Kelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (involving a minor child's
suit against stepmother and father for cruel and inhuman treatment); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (involving a suit by a 15-year-old daughter against her
father for rape).
It should be noted that not only did the above courts cite no common law precedent
for withholding from the children a right to sue their parents, but that each of the
above cases involved an intentional tort, a tort for which today an unemancipated
child can sue his parent. For cases allowing an unemancipated child to sue his parent
for an intentionally inflicted injury, see Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245
(1939); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,77 A.2d 923 (1951).
6 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
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against her father for personal injuries allegedly caused by her father's negli-
gence.7 Plaintiff's father, a general contractor, maintained a storage shed
in a yard adjacent to the family's residence and had placed several snow-
damaged metal awnings with sharp, jagged edges near the shed. The plain-
tiff, three years old when the accident occurred, fell against the awnings
while playing near the shed, severely damaging her left eye. The defendant
father alleged that the child could not maintain an action against him be-
cause of the doctrine of parental immunity in tort actions.8
The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity is generally recognized to
have originated with the case of Hewellette v. George.9 Disregarding the
fact that Hewellette cited no authority, other courts seized upon the case,
and it became generally accepted that an unemancipated minor child could
not maintain a tort action against a parent for injuries negligently inflicted.10
This immunity doctrine, subsequently expanded to cover intentionally in-
flicted injuries," including rape' 2 and cruel and inhuman treatment,13 seems
to be based, not necessarily on the absence of a violated duty, but rather
7 Id. at -, 191 S.E.2d at 224.
8 The defendant father demurred to the plaintiff's motion for judgment "on the
grounds (1) that the child could not maintain this action against him because of the
parental immunity doctrine in tort actions .... " Plaintiff's counsel, on argument on
demurrer,
stated that the father was insured and contended that the parental immunity doc-
trine either should not be applied under the allegations in the motion for judg-
ment or that the doctrine should be abrogated in its entirety.
The trial court sustained the demurrer. Id. at 178, 191 S.E.2d at 224.
9 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
'
0 See, e.g., Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Watson
v. Nichols, 270 N.C 733, 155 S.E.2d 154 (1967); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397
P.2d 771 '(1964); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 RI. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Parker v. Parker,
230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 SE. 888 (1930);
Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Norfolk S. R.R. v.
Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421
P.2d-668 (1966). For a general discussion of the subject of parent-child tort immunity,
see Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904 (1972).
Even though the immunity rule has been seen as a bar of the unemancipated child's
remedy, there has been a concurrent recognition of parental duties. Cosmopolitan Nat.
Bank v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 NE.2d 826 (1970); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa
713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). In
Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963), the court found that the
parent owed the child a duty of due or reasonable care and that the denial of recovery
was being based solely on public policy considerations.
11 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 NE. 128 (1924); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn.
375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
12 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
13 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,77 S.W. 664 (1903).
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on a disability to sue the parent.14 Courts have found a variety of reasons,15
usually based on public policy arguments,' 6 for upholding the disability of
an unemancipated minor child to bring a tort action; however, the main
arguments developed for the immunity doctrine are to preserve domestic
tranquility 7 and to prevent destruction of or interference with parental dis-
cipline and control.' 8
Dissatisfaction with the harshness of the immunity has led some jurisdic-
tions to find exceptions to the doctrine. It has been held that a suit could
be maintained if the child was injured in the course of the parent's business,
rather than personal, activity.-9  The courts have also sustained actions
where a child has been "emancipated." 20 Also, if the parent-child relation-
'4 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,
336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
15 One of the first arguments for upholding the immunity doctrine contended that
allowing the suit would tend to deplete the family exchequer. Supposedly, if the suit
was allowed, one child would take the money which would normally be used for the
benefit of the entire family. See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 SE. 708 (1932);
Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). Contra, Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
Another reason for the immunity is that there would be danger of fraud and collusion
if the child was allowed to maintain a suit. Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d
105 (1968); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). But for recent cases criticizing
this reason, or arguing that the danger of fraud and collusion is present in all liability
insurance cases, see Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106
Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d
490 (1970).
A third reason advanced for the rule is that there is a possibility a parent might
inherit and use the proceeds recovered by the child. Thus, if an insurer was involved
and, after recovery, the child should die, the negligent parent might receive the funds
that were given as a result of his own negligence. See Agustin v. Ortiz, 187 F.2d 496
(1st Cir. 1951); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968).
16 Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
'
1 See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957);
Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 SE. 750 (1931).
18See, e.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 SE. 708 (1932); Brennecke v.
Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12
(1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
' Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963) (duties relating to
father's business); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (master-servant
relationship); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (non-parental trans-
action); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 SE. 538 -(1932) (carrier-passenger relation-
ship). In Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939), the Virginia Supreme
Court allowed an exception to the immunity rule where a carrier-passenger relationship
existed, but the court also had another factor, compulsory liability insurance, to consider
in reaching its decision.
20Weinberg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Super. 448, 244 A.2d 538 (LDiv. 1968); Fitz-
gerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 427 P.2d 655 (1967); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631,
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ship has been terminated by the death of either the parent 2' or the child,22
or both,2 or if the personal injuries have been intentionally inflicted,24 the
child or his personal representative has been allowed to maintain a suit. Al-
though one can argue that the immunity rule is probably no different in
the case of a step-parent 25 or adoptive parent,26 certain jurisdictions have
allowed an action where the negligence was that of an adoptive parent or
a person in loco parentis to the child.27
Shortly after 1960 several jurisdictions took a more direct attack against
354 S.W.2d 789 (1962). "Emancipation" has usually occurred when the parent sur-
renders the right to the child's earnings and services, and to parental control. For a
case defining emancipation, see Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
The emancipation must be complete and not partial, Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va.
577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953), and it must be alleged and proved. Shea v. Pertee, 19 Conn.
Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1954). However, an emancipated child cannot main-
tain an action for a tort committed before emancipation. Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d
67 (Okla. 1964).
21 Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336
S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Palcsey v.
Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962). Contra, Castelluci v. Castellucci, 96
R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963); Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967).
22 Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950) (recovery allowed under wrong-
ful death statute); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (dictum).
23Brinks v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 295 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Dennis
v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (DD.C. 1968).
24 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Treschman v. Treschman,
28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A 2d 923 (1951).
Recovery has also been allowed an unemancipated minor child where his parent has
been guilty of "wilful and wanton" or reckless conduct. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952);
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cowgill v. Brock, 189 Or. 282,
218 P.2d 445 (1950).
Though recovery has been allowed in a case involving gross negligence, Rodebaugh
v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966), it has also been
held that an allegation of gross negligence, even if sustained, would not entitle a child
to recovery. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953). One should
include, when considering earlier Virginia cases such as Brumfield, the recent Virginia
case of Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971), which held that an un-
emancipated minor child could recover from his parent for injuries resulting from an
automobile accident caused by the parent's negligence.
25 Gillet v. Gillet, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wooden
v. Hale, 426 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1967); Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967).
26 Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
27 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (adoptive father); Burdick
v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (1959) (stepfather); Wilkins v. Kane,
74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (Super. Ct. 1962) (grandparent); Cwik v. Zylstra, 58
N.J. Super. 29, 155 A.2d 277 (Super. Ct. 1959) (grandparent).
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the parent-child tort immunity.28 Certain jurisdictions, previously com-
mitted to the rule, judicially abolished it; still others, previously not com-
mitted, refused to adopt it.30 The scope of the attack upon the parental
immunity has ranged from abrogation of the rule in cases involving an
automobile accident,31 to any case involving negligence except those in-
volving the exercise of parental authority or the exercise of parental discre-.
tion in such functions as supplying food, clothing and medical services,3 2
to total abrogation in some jurisdictions.33 To substantiate their positions,
courts abrogating the doctrine have noted the comparison with contract
28The first jurisdictions to start the trend for abrogation of the parent-child im-
munity rule were: Wisconsin, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963); New Hampshire, Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); North
Dakota, Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.E.2d 364 (N.D. 1967). Also, in Xaphes v. Mossey, 224
F. Supp. 578 (D.C.Vt. 1963), a federal court anticipated Vermont law, having no prior
Vermont cases on point, and held that an unemancipated minor child could recover
from his stepfather for personal injuries resulting from stepfather's negligent operation
of an automobile.
2 9 Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d
914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588
(1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
3 0 Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484,
462 P.2d 1007 (1969).
3 1 See, e.g., Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971), although many
may consider this an exception to the immunity rule rather than a partial abrogation.
3 2 See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Goller v. White,
20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
It should be noted for reference in the discussion of the Wright case that under Wis-
consin law, supervision of a child's play does not fall into the second exception given
in the text under this footnote, where the negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, and medical serv-
ices. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968).
aS Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v, Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192,
297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
At least one jurisdiction has taken the view that if the parental immunity rule is no
longer of any benefit, any change should be made by the legislature. Downs v. Poulin,
216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966).
Typical of the reasoning behind the abrogation of the immunity is that of the federal
district court in Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D.C. Vt. 1963), on page 579:
The primary reason asserted to hold that a child cannot sue its parent is that it
would tend to disrupt the peace and harmony of the family unit. First, it is diffi-
cult to see the application of this argument to the facts in this case [the case in-
volved injuries resulting from an automobile accident]. Secondly, the relation-
ships within the family have undergone many changes within the recent decades.
Members of the family are becoming more independent. Insuring oneself against
the negligent operation of an automobile is common, and in fact expected. It
would seem unusual to deny the protection of such a common thing to those
whom the insured would most desire to protect.
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and property damage liability, 4 the existence of liability insurance cover-
age,35 or the lack of a common law rule of immunity.86
Parental tort immunity, wherein a parent is not liable to his unemanci-
pated minor child for personal injuries, was first recognized in Virginia
in Norfolk Southern R.R Co. v. Gretakis.Y The first exception in Virginia
appeared in Worrell v. Worrell.38 In that case, an unemancipated minor
daughter was allowed to sue her father, an operator of a common carrier
of passengers, for injuries she suffered in an accident while a passenger in
her father's bus. It should be noted, however, that the bus was operated
by an employee of the defendant." Similarly, Smith v. Kauffman,40 decided
in 1971, involving personal injuries resulting to an unemancipated minor
from an automobile accident caused by the negligence of the driver-father,
permitted another exception to the immunity rule. Wright is the first case
34 See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Silesky v. Kelman, 281
Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
35 See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W2d
193 (1963).
Prior to the direct attack on the immunity rule, some courts had already started
to recognize liability insurance as a factor in permitting exceptions to the rule. See
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11,
4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). However, most
courts argued that merely because the particular defendant-parent was covered by lia-
bility insurance, the child could not maintain an action if he could not othervise have
done so. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Baker v.
Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953); Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d
570 (1963).
Those jurisdictions that today consider insurance argue that the existence of the
insurance removes the objection to the action on grounds that the family or finances
would be disturbed, Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965), or that the
parental authority would be impaired. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).3 6 See Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969).
37 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934). In Gretakis, there was a collision between plain-
tiff's electric car and defendant's automobile, which was the result of negligence on
the part of both parties. Defendant's minor daughter, a passenger in defendant's auto-
mobile, sued the plaintiff for personal injuries received, and recovered. Plaintiff then
sued defendant for contribution. Defendant demurred, and the demurrer was sustained;
on appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
28 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
39 In allowing an exception to the parental immunity rule, the court emphasized three
elements as influencing its decision: (1) the legislative requirement that the father, as
a motor carrier, must provide liability insurance covering his passengers; (2) the fact
that the father's liability was derivative; and (3) the fact that the child was a "pas-
senger" and that the parent-child relationship was purely incidental. Id. at 26, 4 S.E.2d
at 349.
40212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). The exception in Smith was limited solely to
those injuries resulting from an automobile accident.
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on the doctrine to be decided by the Virginia Supreme Court since the hold-
ing in Smith.
In establishing an exception to the immunity rule in Smith, the Virginia
Supreme Court relied heavily on the high incidence of liability insurance
among Virginia automobile owners.41 The plaintiff in Wright, relying on
Smith, attempted to use the existence of liability insurance by her father to
persuade the court to allow her to maintain her action, arguing that the
defendant carried in force a liability insurance policy at the time of the
accident, and that such policy provided that damages would be paid by the
insurer if the defendant negligently injured anyone in the course of his
business.42 However, the plaintiff failed to present evidence of the preva-
lence in Virginia of the type of insurance that the defendant carried, and
hence, failed to place her case within one of the important considerations
of the Smith case.43
A further argument by the plaintiff in Wright urged that the injury
resulted from the business activities of the parent, which are not within the
area of parental discretion, such that the plaintiff should be able to re-
For a law review article discussing the guest statute issue in Smith, see 6 U. Ricu.
L. REv. 404 (1971). For another article on parent-child tort immunity preceding Smith
and indicating the acceptability of such exception, see 5 U. RiCH. L. REv. 410 (1970).4 1 In Smith v. Kauffntan the court stated:
The very high incidence of liability insurance covering Virginia-based motor
vehicles, together with the mandatory uninsured motorist endorsements to in-
surance policies, has made our rule of parental immunity anachronistic when
applied to automobile accident litigation. In such litigation, the rule can be no
longer supported as generally calculated to promote the peace and tranquility
of the home and the advantageous disposal of the parents' exchequer. A rule
adopted for the common good now prejudices the great majority. 212 Va. 181,
185, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971).
42 Brief for Appellant at 5, Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972)
(It should be noted that the plaintiff's counsel also argued the fact of the defendant's
insurance in his oral arguments before the court). Since insurance was involved, the
plaintiff contended that the suit would not be unfriendly and therefore family har-
mony and domestic tranquility would not be disturbed.
In the appellant's brief, counsel argued that the rule of Smith, which can be used
"as a guideline for governing when an unemancipated child may sue its parent for
personal injuries due to negligence" is:
In situations other than those arising in an area involving parental discretion,
where an unemancipated child is negligently injured by its parent, the child may
maintain an action against the parent for personal injuries received, provided the
parent has in force, at the time, a policy of liability insurance covering such
injuries. Id. at 13.
Apparently, the court was not ready to adopt such a wide ranging interpretation
of Smith.
43 This failure to present evidence concerning the prevalence of the type of insur-
ance that defendant carried was amply pointed out and argued by the defendant's
counsel. Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223,
(1972).
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cover.44 This argument is a generally accepted exception to the immunity
rule,45 and within the facts of the Worrell case,46 this exception has been
recognized in Virginia. Unfortunately, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
any type of business relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as
existed in Worrell. Holding that the negligence of the defendant in placing
the awnings in the yard was not related to his business or vocational ca-
pacity, the court noted that the defendant had merely failed to discharge
his parental duty to supervise the child and to provide his child with a safe
area in which to play 4 7 Thus, because the plaintiff's allegations failed to
establish a business or vocational relationship, or to place the case within
the parameters of the Smith case, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
the daughter had no cause of action against her father.48
It is submitted that the court's holding in Wright halts any further abro-
gation of the parental tort immunity doctrine in Virginia. The court may
have been overly technical in refusing to allow the plaintiff to maintain
her action, because if the reason for the rule no longer applies to automobile
accidents, it would seem that the existence of any type of liability insurance
in a case would also extinguish the reason for the rule regardless of the
area in which the parent's negligence occurs.49 However, the court's ruling
in Wright may not have been strictly limited to the exceptions to the
immunity rule as they now stand. The court declared that it was "unwilling
to further abrogate the doctrine on the basis of plaintiff's allegations and
under the circumstances of this case." 50 However, the court has left open
44 Brief for Appellant at 9, Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
45See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
46 See note 39 supra.
47 As was stated by the court:
In the case at bar plaintiff's allegation that the father was negligent in placing
the awnings in the yard bespeaks only his failure to discharge the normal parental
duty of supervising and providing a safe place for the child to play. Thus the
alleged negligence was incident to the parental relationship of the father with his
unemancipated child, and not to a business or vocational relationship. Wright v.
Wright, 213 Va. 177, 179, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1972).
But as discussed earlier, note 32 supra, at least one jurisdiction has held that super-
vision of a child's play does not fall into the category of an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion.
48 Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 179, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1972).
49 One wonders why there should be a different result when a parent's negligence is
covered by different types of liability insurance. If one of the factors for the holdings
in Worrell and Smith was the existence of liability insurance on motor vehicles, the
existence of insurance should affect the determination of the liability in other negli-
gence situations. Once the reason for the rule no longer exists, the rule should be
eliminated in its entirety.
50 213 Va. at 179, 191 S..2d at 225.
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the possibility in the future that if a plaintiff could place his case in a posi-
tion analogous to the facts of Smith, it might be persuaded to further abro-
gate, partially or totally, the immunity rule.51 However, according to the
requirements52 laid down in Wright, a plaintiff would have to establish
clearly that the reasons for the rule would not do justice to the parties.
I.P.W.
51 The court did not categorically state that it would not abrogate further the im-
munity rule, but only that under the circumstances of the case and plaintiff's allega-
tions, it was unwilling to further abrogate the doctrine. This would indicate that if,
at the present time, a case could be placed within the reasons and factors for the
holding in Smith, recovery might be allowed a minor child other than for injuries
resulting from an automobile accident.
52 213 Va. at 179, 191 SE.2d at 225.
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